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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)1 
provides funding for special education along with a detailed set of 
requirements for state and local agencies. 2  For example, it specifies 
various procedural safeguards, including the right to an impartial 
hearing.3  The IDEA has been the avenue of frequent litigation.4  Due 
to the rather robust application of the exhaustion doctrine in IDEA 
cases,5 the impartial hearing is, for the most part, the exclusive 
                                                            
* Perry A. Zirkel (Ph.D., J.D., U. Connecticut; LL.M., Yale U.) is university 
professor emeritus of education and law at Lehigh University where he formerly 
was dean of the College of Education and more recently held the Iacocca Chair in 
Education for its five-year term.  He has a Ph.D. in Educational Administration and 
a J.D. from the University of Connecticut, and a Master of Laws degree from Yale 
University.  He has written more than 1,450 publications on various aspects of 
school law, with an emphasis on legal issues in special education.     
1 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2012).  Originally enacted as the Education of the 
Handicapped Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 1725 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) 
2 See generally Perry A. Zirkel, A Comprehensive Comparison of the IDEA 
and Section 504/ADA, 282 EDUC. L. REP. 767 (2012), for a systematic overview of 
the various features of the IDEA, including the procedural safeguards, in 
comparison to Section 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
3 20 U.S.C § 1415(f); see also Zirkel, supra note 2, at 768; see generally Perry 
A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems under the IDEA: A State-by-
State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3 (2010) (snapshot of the varying state 
systems administrative adjudications for the IDEA pursuant to cooperative 
federalism); Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping 
Judicialization of Special Education Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27 (2007) (tracing gradual legalization of the impartial 
hearing process under the IDEA). 
4 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The "Explosion" in Education 
Litigation: An Updated Analysis, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2011) (revealing the 
upward trajectory of IDEA litigation within the relatively level trend of K–12 
litigation within the past three decades); Tessie Rose Bailey & Perry A. Zirkel, 
Frequency Trends of Court Decisions under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 28 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 3 (2015) (computing states’ 
relative IDEA judicial decisions rankings); cf. Perry A. Zirkel, Longitudinal Trends 
in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA, 302 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014) (computing the 
relative rankings of the states for due process hearing decisions under the IDEA). 
5 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012).  See Louis Wasserman, Delineating 
Administrative Exhaustion Requirements and Establishing Federal Courts' 
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gateway for IDEA litigation.6  
In turn, one of the significant threshold issues for the impartial 
hearing is the applicable statute of limitations (SOL), including its 
starting point, duration, and effect.  The recent Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision in G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District 
Authority7 illustrates the SOL’s high-stakes significance under the 
IDEA for plaintiff parents, defendant districts, and impartial hearing 
officers (IHOs).  Assessing the decision’s importance and potential 
implications requires a systematic, comprehensive, and relatively 
concise canvassing of the relevant IDEA provisions and related case 
law.  The frame of reference for this case law analysis is the 
prevailing practice of IHOs to apply the SOL as the window for the 
issues and, for the most part, the evidence and relief under the IDEA. 
Prior to the 2004 amendment of the IDEA,8 the statute and its 
extensive regulations9 were silent regarding the SOL at the hearing 
level.  Because most jurisdictions lacked a corollary state law 
addressing the SOL at the hearing level, courts utilized a borrowing 
approach to fill this gap based on the applicable state’s analogous 
law, resulting in a wide variety of results.10 
                                                            
Jurisdiction under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Lessons from 
the Case Law and Proposals for Congressional Action, 29 J. NAT’L ADMIN. L. 
JUDICIARY 349 (2009), for a comprehensive overview, including the relatively 
narrow exceptions, of this exhaustion provision as applied to IDEA claims.  The 
application to this provision to non-IDEA claims is a separate matter, although it 
reinforces its relative rigorousness.  See, e.g., Peter J. Maher, Caution on 
Exhaustion: The Courts' Misinterpretation of the IDEA's Exhaustion Requirement 
for Claims Brought by Students Covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
and the ADA But Not by the IDEA, 44 CONN. L. REV. 259 (2011).  Finally, for the 
intersection of exhaustion and SOL, see, e.g., Molina v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Lunas 
Sch., 67 IDELR ¶ 18 (D.N.M. 2015). 
6 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA: A 
Follow-Up Analysis, 303 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014); Perry A. Zirkel, Longitudinal 
Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA, 302 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014) 
(computing states’ relative IDEA due process hearing decisions rankings). 
7 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015).  A month after the decision, the Third Circuit 
denied the defending district’s motion for rehearing en banc.   
8 118 Stat. 2647, 2803 (P.L 108-446, § 302(a)(1)) (Dec. 4, 2004). 
9 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-300.818 (2014). 
10 See Perry A. Zirkel & Peter J. Maher, The Statute of Limitations under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 175 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2003), for a 
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However, the 2004 IDEA amendment filled this gap, providing 
SOL provisions for both the hearing and judicial levels.11  The 
purpose of this article, in light of the practical significance and the 
limited literature addressing the IDEA’s hearing level SOL,12 is to 
provide a current and concise overview of the case law addressing 
this specific issue.13  Part I provides the basic nature and purpose of 
                                                            
snapshot of each state’s pre-IDEA SOL period for both the hearing and court 
levels. 
11 See infra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text, for impartial hearings SOL.  
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) for the judicial level SOL which requires filing for 
judicial review within ninety days of the IHO’s decision unless a state law specifies 
a different period. 
12 See, e.g., Jennifer R. Valverde, A Poor IDEA: Statute of Limitations 
Decisions Cement Second Class Remedial Scheme for Low Income Children with 
Disabilities in the Third Circuit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 599 (2013) (advocating for 
Congress and the courts to adopt the approach that the IDEA statute of limitations 
constitute a filing deadline that does not limit the scope of compensatory education 
relief). 
13 In contrast, the scope of this article does not extend to the more extensive 
case law concerning the IDEA SOL for the judicial stage generally.  See, e.g., 
Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014); M.R. v. Ridley 
Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2014); J.H. v. Nevada City Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR 
¶ 77 (D. Nev. 2015); Boatright v. Sch. Bd. of Polk Cnty., 52 IDELR ¶ 101 (M.D. 
Fla. 2009); cf. Piazza v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d 669 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (SOL for unexhausted claims).  Moreover, it does not extend to 
the even more extensive case law concerning the IDEA SOL for the judicial stage 
as applied to attorneys’ fees claims.  See, e.g., D.G. v. New Caney Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 806 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2015); Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. D.A., 792 
F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2015); Walhovd v. Bellflower Unified Sch. Dist., 526 F. App’x 
803 (9th Cir. 2013); Bd. of Educ. of Evanston-Skokie Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. v. 
Luca, 66 IDELR ¶ 135 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 80 F. Supp. 3d 
332 (D. Mass. 2015); Brittany O. v. Bentonville Sch. Dist., 64 IDELR ¶ 299 (E.D. 
Ark. 2015); Concepcion-Torres v. Puerto Rico, 43 F. Supp.3d 170 (D.P.R. 2014); 
Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 64 IDELR ¶ 10 (D.D.C. 2014); T.T. v. Cnty. of 
Marin, 62 IDELR ¶ 49 (N.D. Cal. 2013); C.L. v. Lucia Mar Cent. Sch. Dist., 61 
IDELR ¶ 224 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Toledo, 950 F. 
Supp. 2d 246 (N.D. Ohio 2013); Northport Pub. Sch. v. Woods, 60 IDELR ¶ 154 
(W.D. Mich. 2013).  Another such exclusion is for the SOL for student claims 
under section 504 of the Americans with Disabilities Act.  See, e.g., P.P. v. W. 
Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727 (3d Cir. 2009); Ripple v. Marble Falls Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 99 F. Supp. 3d 662 (W.D. Tex. 2015); T.L. v. Sherwood Charter Sch., 
62 IDELR ¶ 284 (D. Or. 2014); Pagan-Negron v. Seguin Indep. Sch. Dist., 974 F. 
Supp. 2d 1020 (W.D. Tex. 2013); Kabacinski v. State of Del. Dep’t of Educ., 62 
IDELR ¶ 133 (D. Del. 2013); Gaudino v. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist., 61 IDELR ¶ 
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SOL generally, and specifically how SOL applies to the IDEA’s 
impartial hearings.  Parts II–IV addresses the elements of the SOL 
statutory provisions in terms of the triggering date, the exceptions, 
and the duration and effect of the SOL, including the importance of 
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District Authority.14  Part V provides 
practice pointers for IDEA IHOs.   
 
I. SOL GENERALLY AND AS SPECIFICALLY APPLIED  
                    TO IDEA IMPARTIAL HEARINGS 
 
The SOL general nature and purposes, as Zirkel and Maher 
observed, are: 
“Statute of limitations” is a legislative expression of policy that 
prohibits litigants from bringing claims after a period of time, 
which destroys any right and remedy of the potential 
claimant.15 It applies specifically to a particular action in law or 
equity, whether civil or criminal.  Its purposes are to 1) to 
require that claims be advanced while the evidence to rebut 
them is not stale, and 2) to penalize dilatoriness for the sake of 
repose.16 
As a result of the 2004 amendments, the IDEA contains two 
provisions regarding the IHO-level SOL.17  In this context, SOL has 
                                                            
193 (M.D. Pa. 2013); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Toledo, 948 F. Supp. 2d 793 
(N.D. Ohio 2013); Brown v. Napa Valley Sch. Dist., 59 IDELR ¶ 291 (N.D. Cal. 
2012); J.W. v. Johnston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 59 IDELR ¶ 246 (E.D.N.C. 2012); 
Baker v. S. York Area Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 214 (M.D. Pa. 2009). 
14 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015).  The overall focus here will be on the hearings 
where the parents are the filing party, which is the typical posture.  However, the 
IDEA’s SOL provisions also apply to districts that file more than a negligible 
proportion of IDEA impartial hearings.  See, e.g., Cathy A. Skidmore & Perry A. 
Zirkel, Has the Supreme Court’s Schaffer Decision Placed a Burden on Hearing 
Officer Decision-Making under the IDEA, 35  J. NAT’L ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 304 
(2015) (finding that districts filed eighteen percent of a sample of IDELR-
published IHO decisions from 1978 to 2013).   
15 Zirkel & Maher, supra note 10, at 2 (citing Estate of Busch v. Ferrel-Duncan 
Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985). 
16 Zirkel & Maher, supra note 10, at 2 (citing Ochs v. Fed. Ins. Co., 447 A.2d 
153 (N.J. 1982)).  
17 See infra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text.  The 2006 regulations merely 
mirror the wording of these two SOL provisions without elaboration.  34 C.F.R §§ 
300.507(a)(2), 300.511(e) (2013). 
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these same basic purposes as in civil law more generally.18  The first 
provision, under the caption “timeline for requesting hearing” is:  
A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process 
hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or 
should have known about the alleged action that forms the 
basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time 
limitation for requesting such a hearing under this subchapter, 
in such time as the State law allows.19 
The second provision, under “types of procedures,” provides the 
following specification for the request, referred to synonymously as 
“the complaint”20:  
sets forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than 2 
years before the date the parent or public agency knew or 
should have known about the alleged action that forms the 
basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time 
limitation for presenting such a complaint under this 
subchapter, in such time as the State law allows, except that the 
exceptions to the timeline described in subsection (f)(3)(D) 
shall apply to the timeline described in this subparagraph.21 
The remaining parts of this article address the case law specific to 
each of the features of this pair of provisions, including the 
exceptions and the durational issues in the Third Circuit’s recent G.L. 
decision.22  As a transitional threshold matter, the limited prevailing 
view is that the SOL is an affirmative defense.23  Consequently, the 
burden of persuasion is on the party asserting the defense,24 with the 
                                                            
18 See, e.g., Holden v. Miller-Smith, 28 F Supp. 3d 729, 735 (W.D. Mich. 
2014) (“The two-year period [under the amended IDEA] permits plaintiffs to 
exercise their rights . . . within a reasonable period of time, protects potential 
defendants from a protracted fear of litigation, and promotes judicial efficiency by 
preventing . . . courts from having to litigate stale claims.”). 
19 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). 
20 See, e.g., id. §§ 1415(b)(6), 1415(b)(8), 1415(c)(2)(A), 1415(d)(1)(A). 
21 Id. § 1415(b)(6)(B). 
22 G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2015).   
23 See, e.g., M.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 296, 304, 306 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Somoza v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 111 (2d 
Cir. 2008)). 
24 See, e.g., K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295, at *16–17 
(E.D.N.Y. 2014).  For applying  waiver at the impartial hearing level, see, e.g., 
Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 116 LRP 5716 (Pa. SEA Jan. 4, 2016) (“in the 
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burden shifting to the party asserting exceptions to the SOL.25 
Figure 1 provides a visual organizer for the next parts of the 
article. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Framework for SOL at the IDEA’s IHO Stage 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________ 
 * different period if specified in applicable state law 
 
 
When the SOL is at issue, the primary and central step, which is 
designated in Figure 1 as circled number 1, is the sometimes difficult 
determination of the KOSHK date, also referred to herein at the 
triggering date.  Next is determining whether the claim is timely in 
terms of the applicable period (i.e., two years unless specified 
otherwise in state law or unless an exception applies) from the 
KOSHK date to the easily ascertainable filing date, which is number 
                                                            
absence of guidance, I conclude that affirmative defenses must be raised sometime 
before the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing"). 
25 See, e.g., Reg’l Sch. Unit 51 v. Doe, 920 F. Supp. 2d 168, 197 (D. Me. 
2013); G.I. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 61 IDELR ¶ 298, at *9 (E.D. Tex. 
2013); J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 622 F. Supp. 2d 257, 268 (W.D. Pa. 
2008). 
2 3 1 
FAPE denial
starting date 
KOSHK 
date 
filing  
date 
2 years* unless exception 
4 
remedy 
? 
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2 in the Figure.  Next, if the filing is timely, the question arises as to 
whether the period extends to a point earlier than the KOSHK date 
based on the underlying action, designated above as number 3 - the 
starting date for the claimed denial of FAPE.  Finally, if the parent 
ultimately proves the requisite denial of FAPE, the determination of 
the equitable remedy (e.g., compensatory education or tuition 
reimbursement) may be for a time period longer, shorter, or equal to 
the deprivation of FAPE.26  The next two parts of the article address 
the KOSHK date and the potentially asserted exceptions, whereas 
Part IV addresses the resulting calculations for the duration of the 
period for liability, including the effect in terms of the potentially 
resulting remedy. 
 
II. TRIGGERING DATE 
 
It is not uncommon for IHOs to follow the lead of courts to apply 
the IDEA SOL without specific discussion or analysis, as a “look 
back” from the date of filing.27  However, as the first 
aforementioned28 statutory provision makes clear, the triggering date 
                                                            
26 For the range of equitable remedies under the IDEA, see, e.g., Perry A. 
Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Update, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. 
L. JUDICIARY 1 (2011).  For more detail on the primary two remedies, see, e.g., 
Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition and Related Reimbursement under the IDEA: A Decisional 
Checklist, 282 EDUC. L. REP. 785 (2012); Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory 
Education: An Annotated Update of the Law, 251 EDUC. L. REP. 501 (2010).  For 
the calculation of compensatory education that may yield periods not identical to 
the duration of the FAPE denial, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Two Competing 
Approaches for Calculating Compensatory Education under the IDEA, 257 EDUC. 
L. REP. 550 (2010).  Moreover, to the recognized extent that the equities apply to 
the determination of tuition reimbursement, the period for this remedy may be less 
than that for the denial of FAPE.  See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C). 
27 See, e.g., C.B. v. Special Sch. Dist., 636 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2011); Davis v. 
Hampton Pub. Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 231 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d mem., 352 F. 
App’x 780 (4th Cir. 2009); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413, Marshall v. H.M.J. ex rel. 
A.J., M.N., No. CIV. 14-2114 JRT/HB, 2015 WL 4744505 (D. Minn. Aug. 11, 
2015); Coleman v. Pottstown Sch. Dist., 983 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Pa. 2013); Pass 
v. Rollinsford Sch. Dist., 928 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D.N.H. 2013); Swope v. Cent. York 
Sch. Dist., 58 IDELR ¶ 32 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Littman v. Livingston Twp. Sch. Dist., 
55 IDELR ¶ 139 (D.N.J. 2010); cf. Hooker v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 IDELR ¶ 
166 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (parallel state law but for one-year period). 
28 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
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for the filing deadline is that upon which the parent “knew or had 
reason to know,” which some courts have referred to as the “know or 
should have known” (KOSHK) date.29  Moreover, the KOSHK is 
specifically connected in the statute to the “alleged action that forms 
the basis of the complaint.”30  In the cases to date, courts have 
variously interpreted this connection.31  For example, taking a strict 
approach, one federal district court in an unpublished decision 
concluded that, based on the plain language of the statute, this 
limitations period is “two years from the date that the parents knew 
of the complained-of action, not two years from the date that the 
parents knew the action taken was wrong.”32  Similarly, another 
federal court clarified that the KOSHK is specific to the action, not 
when it was actionable.33  Representing a more forgiving approach, 
more than one other court, including the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, interpreted the KOSHK as not applying until the parents 
                                                            
29 See, e.g., G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 604 n.2. 
30 Id. 
31 In some cases, the underlying action is clear-cut.  See, e.g., Mittman v. 
Livingston Twp. Bd. of Educ., 55 IDELR ¶ 139 (D.N.J. 2010) (identifying the 
action as the IEP team’s exiting the child from special education).  However, 
defining the KOSHK date in tuition reimbursement cases in a similarly per se way 
as the time of the unilateral placement, e.g., R.B. v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 57 
IDELR ¶ 155, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing M.D. v. Southington Bd. of Educ., 334 
F.3d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 2003), which was based on Section 1983 accrual), is 
imprecise because 1) it is not necessarily identical to the underlying action, and 2) 
the date of the unilateral placement arguably could be the date of deposit, the date 
of the end of the school year, or the first day of attendance at the private school). 
32 Bell v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 50 IDELR ¶ 285, at *15 
(D.N.M. 2010).  Although the IDEA SOL applies equally to the school district, in 
this case the parents were the filing party.  Moreover, in this case the action was the 
district’s individualized education program (IEP) classification of the child, 
whereas it was not until much later that the parents knew or had reason to know 
that this action was allegedly a misclassification.  Based on undisputed evidence 
that the parents know of the child’s classification upon the development of the first 
IEP, the court concluded that the period began to run at that earlier date, thus 
expiring before the filing of their hearing request.  The court alternatively used the 
term “accrue” for the start of the period.  Id. at *17. 
33 J.P. v. Enid Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 112, at *5 (W.D. Okla. 2009) 
(concluding that the triggering date is “when the parent ‘knew or should have 
known about the alleged action that form the basis of the complaint,’ and not when 
the parent becomes aware that the school district’s actions are actionable”). 
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have the necessary facts of the alleged violation. 34  Finally, using 
language that originated with section 1983 federal civil rights 
claims,35 various other courts reached mixed results based on the 
more ambiguous translation of the target KOSHK event as the 
“injury.”36 
The determination of the KOSHK date is critical but problematic 
regardless of the semantic formulation of the underlying action.  A 
Pennsylvania case serves as an example.37  The student, who had a 
lifelong gastrointestinal condition that caused cyclic vomiting, 
experienced continuing difficulties in school starting in kindergarten 
based in part on health-related attendance issues.38  His parents 
withdrew him for parochial schooling in grades one through four and, 
after hospitalization, again in grades seven through nine.39  The 
parents filed for an impartial hearing on January 23, 2009, in the 
middle of grade twelve.40  The IHO used a look back period to 
eliminate the period before the middle of grade ten.41  For the 
                                                            
34 See, e.g., Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2008); 
K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Gwinnett Cnty. 
Sch. Dist. v. A.A., 54 IDELR ¶ 316 (N.D. Ga. 2010).  The K.H. court similarly 
referred to the start of this period as “claim accrual.”  K.H. v. N.Y.C.  Dep’t of 
Educ., 63 IDELR at *14. 
 35 See, e.g., Alexopulos v. Riles, 784 F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Under 
federal law a cause of action generally accrues when a plaintiff learns of the injury 
which is the basis of his action.”).  The bridge in the New York cases was M.D. v. 
Southington Bd. of Educ., 334 F.3d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 2003). 
36 See, e.g., G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 607, 611; 
Lauren G. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D. Pa. 2012); 
R.B. v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 57 IDELR ¶ 155 (S.D.N.Y 2011); C.B. v. 
Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 54 IDELR ¶ 149 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).  All of these cases 
refer to the triggering of the SOL in terms of accrual.  Lauren G. v. W. Chester 
Area Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d at 386; R.B. v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y.C., 57 
IDELR at *4; C.B. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 54 IDELR at *16; see also Somoza 
v. N.Y.C.  Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (bridging the pre 
IDEA 2004 and the IDEA 2004 SOL). 
37 Centennial Sch. Dist. v. S.D., 58 IDELR ¶ 45 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
38 Id. at *2. 
39 Id. at *2–3. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at *2.  The IHO in this case did some mental manipulations before 
ultimately arriving at a look back period.  More specifically, first finding the 
KOSHK to be in 2001, the IHO reasoned that every day of alleged denial of FAPE 
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remaining two-year period, the IHO ruled in the parent’s favor, 
concluding that the district should have identified the student as 
eligible under the IDEA and provided him with the required free 
appropriate public education (FAPE).42  Upon both parties’ appeal, 
the court cited the aforementioned43 Oklahoma case for the KOSHK 
reference point, which in this case was “[the district’s failure] to 
respond sufficiently and effectively to concerns expressed by parents 
about a child's functioning in school.”44  The parents contended that 
they did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged 
denial of services until 2008.45  The district argued that the KOSHK 
date was far earlier because they would have known of their right to 
request an evaluation by either checking the annual notice of IDEA 
rights that the district published in the local newspaper and included 
on the parent calendars or consulting an attorney.46  However, 
apparently viewing the complaint as including a child find claim,47 
the court reasoned that “a reasonable inference from the evidence is 
that the District's failure to provide [the] parents with a ‘permission 
to evaluate form’ . . . could have led them to believe that: (1) [the 
student] had no rights under the IDEA; or (2) a request for an 
evaluation or a meeting with an attorney would be fruitless.”48  As a 
result, the court concluded that the KOSHK date was “at least at the 
end of 2006–2007,” thus making their complaint timely.49  However, 
although not entirely clear, the effect of this determination in this 
case appears to have been to merely confirm the two-year denial of 
                                                            
was a separate action, thus ultimately concluding that "every date up to January 23, 
2007, two years back from the date Parents filed the instant complaint on January 
23, 2009, is untimely.”  Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See J.P. v. Enid Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 112 (W.D. Okla. 2009) 
44 Centennial Sch. Dist. v. S.D., 58 IDELR ¶ 45 *5 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
45 Id. 
       46 Id. at. *6. 
47 For the reasonable suspicion and reasonable period requirements of child 
find; see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, “Child Find”: The Lore v. the Law, 307 EDUC. L. 
REP. 574 (2014). 
48 Centennial Sch. Dist. v. S.D., 58 IDELR at *6. 
49 Id. at *7.  It may be argued that the court’s reasoning contradicted its recited 
standard, because the parent knew of the alleged failure much earlier but did not 
realize that this action (or in this case, inaction) was actionable until the designated 
time (or at the time they finally did consult an attorney and file for a hearing). 
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FAPE, whereas an alternative interpretation would be to extend the 
remedy back to whenever the district had reason to evaluate the 
student as eligible.50 
It is likely that school districts and parents will separately try to 
document or otherwise solidify proof of the triggering date and action 
that favors their position.  Such evidence will include not only the 
documented history of the case but also the testimony at the hearing.  
For example, in a recent New Hampshire case, the guardian’s 
testimony was the key in determining the SOL for her challenge to 
the IEPs for grades nine, ten, and eleven.51  Specifically, the guardian 
testified on direct examination that when she signed the IEP for grade 
nine, she did so to confirm her participation, but not to agree with the 
contents because she “felt that [the student] needed more.”52  The 
court concluded that this testimony preponderantly proved that she 
discovered the district’s alleged violation on the date of signing the 
IEP, “thus triggering the running of the limitations period.”53 
Because she did not request a hearing until two and a half years later, 
she was time-barred from challenging the ninth grade IEP but not the 
two subsequent IEPs.54 Similarly, evidence of whether and when the 
district provided the parents with the procedural safeguards notice 
may be critical as to the triggering date.55 
 
                                                            
50 Oddly straddling the fence between child find and FAPE, the court declined 
to rule on whether the student was eligible for services under the IDEA.  Id. at *8 
n.12. 
51 Pass v. Rollinsford Sch. Dist., 928 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D.N.H. 2013). 
52 Id. at 364. 
53 Id.  The court accorded weight to the guardian’s contention that “a parent or 
guardian who lacks expertise in the field of special education may not recognize an 
IEP’s deficient design until the IEP is implemented and problems begin to 
emerge,” but concluded that her testimony that she immediately appreciated the 
IEPs defects as even weightier.  Id. at 365 n.8.  For another such determination, see 
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Lolita S., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1123 (N.D. Ala. 
2013), aff’d on other grounds, 581 F. App’x 760 (11th Cir. 2014) (reasoning that 
the parent, who was “not a novice to the special education system, having other 
children who were involved in special education,” had reason to know of her child 
find claim when she received the students failing grades). 
54 928 F. Supp. 2d 349 at 364. 
55 See, e.g., Marc V. v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 455 F. Supp. 2d 577, 591 (W.D. 
Tex. 2006) (upholding the IHO’s determination that the KOSHK date was when 
the parents’ received the procedural safeguards notice). 
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III. EXCEPTIONS 
 
The IDEA specifies two exceptions.  Additionally, parties 
seeking to avoid being time-barred have asserted the alternative 
theories of equitable tolling, minority tolling, and continuing 
violations.56   
A. Specified Exceptions 
 
1. Misrepresentation.   
 
The first of the IDEA’s two explicit exceptions concerns 
misrepresentation, specifically providing that the SOL shall not apply 
under the following circumstances: “if the parent was prevented from 
requesting the hearing due to—(i) specific misrepresentations by the 
local educational agency that it had resolved the problem forming the 
basis of the complaint.”57  This language includes not only specific 
misrepresentations but also a causal connection (via “prevented”) and 
a limiting predicate (i.e., resolving the underlying action).58 
 The leading case thus far is the Third Circuit’s published decision 
in D.K. v. Abington School District.59  For the “specific 
misrepresentation” element, the court agreed with most of the district 
courts in the circuit60 that intent, not merely negligence, was 
required.  Thus, the Third Circuit ruled that to qualify for this 
exception “plaintiffs must show that the school intentionally misled 
them or knowingly deceived them regarding their child’s progress.”61 
Applying this exception, the D.K. court concluded that the various 
conferences and other communications with the parents fell “well 
                                                            
56 See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
57 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D) (2012). 
58 Id.  
59 696 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2012). 
60 Id. at 245 (citing I.H. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762 
(M.D. Pa. 2012); Evan H. v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 51 IDELR ¶ 157 
(E.D. Pa. 2008)).  The court did not cite two other prior pertinent lower court 
rulings: Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia v. Deborah A., 52 IDELR ¶ 67 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 
24, 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 422 F.3d 766 (3d Cir. 2011) (agreeing with the 
narrow interpretation); J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 622 F. Supp. 2d 257 
(W.D. Pa. 2009) (adopting a broader view). 
61 D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d at 246. 
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short” of not only the intentional or knowing requirement, but also 
the problem-resolution requirement.62  Thus, the D.L. court did not 
the aforementioned63 third essential element—causation. 
 The causation element was the undoing of the parents’ assertion 
of this exception in a pre-D.K. district court decision in Indiana.64  In 
this case, the court expressed doubt but did not definitively decide 
whether the alleged testing information violations constituted 
misrepresentation, concluding that the parents failed to show how 
this asserted misrepresentation prevented the parents from requesting 
a hearing within the prescribed period.65  Similarly, the causation 
requirement led to the failure to qualify for this exception in a post-
D.K. decision in Pennsylvania.66 
 Conversely, the intent requirement was fatal for parents in 
various lower court decisions post-D.K.  First, in two successive 
decisions within the Third Circuit, federal district courts ruled that 
the parents failed to prove the requisite intentional or knowing 
misrepresentation.67  Second, the federal district court in Maine 
                                                            
62 Id. at 247. 
63 See supra text accompanying note 58.  
64 Tindell v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 805 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. 
Ind. 2011). 
       65 Id. at 643-44. 
66 Shadie v. Forte, 61 IDELR ¶ 40, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d on other 
grounds sub nom Shadie v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 580 F. App’x 67 (3d Cir. 
2014).  For a post-D.K. claim that, prior to these other elements, failed at the 
threshold because the only misrepresentation was by the state education agency, 
not the defendant school district, see Jenkins v. Butts Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. CIV 
5:15-CV-30 (MTT), 2016 WL 740461 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2016) (“[the parent] has 
presented no evidence that the Defendant made a misrepresentation that prevented 
her from requesting a due process hearing”).  
67 Coleman v. Pottstown Sch. Dist., 983 F. Supp. 2d 543, 569 (E.D. Pa. 2013), 
aff’d on other grounds, 581 F. App’x 141 (3d Cir. 2014); W.H. v. Schuykill Valley 
Sch. Dist., 954 F. Supp. 2d 315 (E.D. Pa. 2013).  In Coleman, the court rejected the 
parents’ contention that D.K. extended the standard to egregious misstatements or 
willful indifference, concluding that this argument was unconvincing and, in any 
event, lacking in preponderant proof in this case.  Id. at 569 n.57.  The effect of the 
Coleman court’s ruling was to uphold the IHO’s look-back time bar against the 
claims beyond the two-year period prior to filing.  Id. at 569.  In W.H., the court 
relied on the lower court decisions that foreshadowed D.K. (supra note 60), 
although the effect was less clear in terms of the application of the two-year period.  
W.H. v. Schuykill Valley Sch. Dist., 954 F. Supp. 2d at 318, 324 (exclusion of 
2008–2009, which was largely beyond the two-year look-back period). 
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followed D.K. to require intentionality, which the parents failed to 
prove.68  Third, a federal district court decision in Texas, which has a 
one-year limitations period69 per the IDEA express allowance,70 
followed a pre-D.K. decision in Texas to apply and find unproven a 
similarly strict, although not precisely stated, standard.71  
 In the only available decision thus far where the parents 
succeeded in their assertion of the misrepresentation exception, a 
federal district court concluded that the district’s knowing 
misstatement to the parents about its evaluation obligation interfered 
with the parents’ filing the complaint.72  However, this court’s 
application of the exception confirmed rather than contradicted the 
conclusion that its scope is relatively narrow.  
 
2. Information-Withholding.   
 
The second of the two exceptions concerns information-
withholding, specifically providing that the SOL does not apply 
under the following circumstances: “if the parent was prevented from 
requesting the hearing due to . . . (ii) the local educational agency's 
withholding of information from the parent that was required under 
                                                            
68 Ms. S. v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 72, 64 IDELR ¶ 202 (D. Me. 2014), adopted, 65 
IDELR ¶ 140 (D. Me. 2015). 
69 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1151(c) (2013). 
70 See supra text accompanying notes 19, 21. 
71 Z.H. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 106 (E.D. Tex. 2015), 
adopted, 65 IDELR ¶ 147 (E.D. Tex. 2015) (ruling that mere disagreements about 
the child’s evaluation were insufficient and noting that the KOSHK date was 
unproven) (citing C.H. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 815 F. Supp. 2d 977 (E.D. Tex. 
2011)) (ruling that the alleged misrepresentations either were not before the 
prescribed SOL period or were not at the requisite level of bad faith or not proven). 
       72 Ravenswood City Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 870 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  
For the knowing element, the court reasoned as follows: “The [d]istrict knew or 
had reason to know that its statement . . . was erroneous given the fact that it had 
previously litigated and lost the same argument.”  Id. at 789.  For the causation, or 
interference, element, the court deferred to the IHO’s credibility-based findings.  
Id.  However, a subsequent decision in Maine interpreted this decision more 
narrowly, concluding that “[i]n Ravenswood, no question was raised as to whether 
the school district's misrepresentations to the parent were intentional.”  Ms. S. v. 
Reg’l Sch. Unit 72, 64 IDELR ¶ 202, at *10 (D. Me. 2014), adopted, 65 IDELR ¶ 
140 (D. Me. 2015). 
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this [IDEA] subchapter to be provided to the parent.”73 Again, as the 
leading decision, the Third Circuit in D.K. interpreted this exception 
narrowly, concluding that parents could satisfy it 1) “only by 
showing that the school failed to provide them with a written notice, 
explanation or form specifically required by the IDEA statutes and 
regulations,”74 and 2) this withholding “caused [the parents’] failure 
to request a hearing . . . on time.”75  Applying this exception, the 
court concluded that 1) the documents that the parents identified as 
not having received—the procedural safeguards notice and 
permission to evaluate form—were not required under the 
circumstances of their child, and 2) even if they had been required, 
the parents had failed to show the requisite causation.76   
 The causation requirement was also fatal to the parents’ 
information-withholding exception claim in a subsequent Ninth 
Circuit decision.77  In this case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the 
district failed to provide the parents with certain required student 
progress data, but this violation did not establish the asserted 
exception because “[t]he parents fail[ed] to demonstrate how receipt 
of [this] data, and for that matter the [allegedly belated] notice of 
procedural safeguards . . .  would have caused them to file the due 
process complaint earlier.”78  In a Pennsylvania case, the court 
concluded that the parents failed to prove both the requisite causation 
                                                            
73 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D) (2012). 
74 D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 246 (3d Cir. 2012). 
75 Id.  The court derived this “causation requirement” from the “prevented” 
language that is the lead-in for both exceptions.  Id.  
76 Id. at 247–48. 
77 M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Shadie 
v. Forte, 61 IDELR ¶ 40, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d on other grounds sub nom 
Shadie v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 580 F. App’x 67 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing the 
“‘high threshold’” that D.K. established). 
78 M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d at 859.  For the assuming arguendo 
reference to the procedural safeguards notice, the court upheld the IHO’s credibility 
finding, because it met the requisite “careful and thorough” standard for judicial 
deference, that the district had provided this required notice on a timely basis.  Id.  
The effect in this case was to uphold the IHO’s otherwise unchallenged “look 
back” bar of any claims more than two years before the date of filing the complaint.  
Id.  
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and the required withheld information.79  Moreover, focusing on the 
information element, a lengthening line of court decisions has limited 
this second exception to the procedural safeguards requirements of 
the IDEA, which none of these plaintiff-parents fulfilled.80 
 In contrast, relatively few parents have hurdled the prevailing 
standards for the information withholding exception.  First, in an 
Alaska case, the federal district court duly deferred to the IHO’s 
decision that the parent qualified for this exception “under the unique 
facts of this case.”81  The district provided a notice of procedural 
safeguards that suggested a three-year period rather than the one-year 
SOL that is applicable under Alaska law, which appeared to  be the 
key factual finding.82  Second, in the aforementioned case that 
primarily relied on the misrepresentation exception,83 the court 
additionally and briefly ruled that the failure to provide the parents 
with the procedural safeguards notice triggered the information-
withholding exception.84  Third, in the strongest decision in the 
                                                            
79 W.H. v. Schuykill Valley Sch. Dist., 954 F. Supp. 2d 315, 323 (E.D. Pa. 
2013)); cf. G.W. v. Rye City Dep’t of Educ., 61 IDELR ¶ 14 (S.D.N.Y 2013) 
(unproven withholding of information). 
80 See, e.g., Z.H. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 106, at *8–9 
(E.D. Tex. 2015), adopted, 65 IDELR ¶ 147 (E.D. Tex. 2015); Avila v. Spokane 
Sch. Dist., 64 IDELR ¶ 171, at *8–9 (E.D. Wash. 2014); G.I. v. Lewisville Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 61 IDELR ¶ 298, at *10 (E.D. Tex. 2013); Swope v. Cent. York Sch. 
Dist., 58 IDELR ¶ 32 (M.D. Pa. 2012); C.H. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 815 F. Supp. 
2d 977, 986 (E.D. Tex. 2011); Tindell v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 805 
F. Supp. 2d 630, 644–45 (S.D. Ind. 2011); Hooker v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 56 
IDELR ¶ 232, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2011); Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia v. Deborah A., 52 
IDELR ¶ 67, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2009); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R., 567 F. 
Supp. 2d 918, 944–45 (W.D. Tex. 2008); D.G. v. Somerset Hills Sch. Dist., 559 F. 
Supp. 2d 484, 492 (D.N.J. 2008); cf. Moyer v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 60 
IDELR ¶ 126, at *10 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Baker v. S. York Area Sch. Dist., 53 
IDELR ¶ 214 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (limiting the procedural safeguards failure to the 
relevant period).  The effect of most of these rulings was to apply an otherwise 
unchallenged “look-back” bar of any claims more than two-years before the date of 
filing the complaint.  For an exception to this line of decisions, see infra note 86 
and accompanying text. 
81 Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. D.Y., 54 IDELR ¶ 52, at *3 (D. 
Alaska 2010). 
82 Id.  For the Alaska law, see ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.193(a) (West 2014).   
83 See supra text accompanying note 57. 
84 Ravenswood City Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 870 F. Supp. 2d 780, 789 (N.D. Cal. 
2012).  The cursory analysis did not address the causation element.  Id. 
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parents’ favor, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the district’s failure to 
include the required members of the IEP team that caused the parents 
not to file on time fulfilled the information-withholding exception.85  
Finally, a federal district court in Maine concluded that the failure to 
provide the parents with the procedural safeguards notice at the 
relevant time, regardless of the district’s good faith and any previous 
such notice, fulfilled the plaintiff’s information and causation 
requisites of this exception.86   
The only other examples were for more limited success.  In an 
Idaho case, the court dismissed the case without prejudice based on 
the parents’ failure to exhaust the impartial hearing provision of the 
IDEA.  In doing so, the court provided nonbinding but rather strongly 
worded guidance that the withholding exception should apply 
because the district failed to provide the procedural safeguards notice 
upon a change in the student’s placement.87  Somewhat similarly, in a 
Georgia case, the court concluded that the parents pled sufficient 
facts to survive the motion to dismiss her claim of this exception,88 
but in line with its warning that the subsequently developed record 
could yield a different outcome89 and after remand to the IHO, the 
court upheld the exception’s applicability in this case.90 In any event, 
all of these cases confirmed rather than contradicted the prevailing 
and relatively narrow interpretation of the scope of information under 
                                                            
85 S.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 487 F. App’x 850, 864 (5th Cir. 2012).  But 
cf. Reyes v. Manor Indep. Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 33, at *5–6 (W.D. Tex. 2016) 
(following S.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist. based on broader information 
interpretation but ultimately distinguishing it based on causation factor). 
86 Reg’l Sch. Unit 51 v. Doe, 920 F. Supp. 2d 168, 197–203 (D. Me. 2013). 
       87 Kelly O. v. Taylor Crossing Pub. Charter Sch., 61 IDELR ¶ 295, at *10 (D. 
Idaho 2013) (“because the school failed to provide [the] parents with notice on how 
to present such claims, they should not now be time barred from doing so. . . .  
[The] district may not be out of the ‘deep doo doo’ just yet.”). 
88 Jenkins v. Butts Cnty. Sch. Dist., 984 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1379 (M.D. Ga. 
2013) (basing this conclusion on the district’s alleged failure to provide the 
required prior written notice and procedural safeguards notice). 
89 Id. at 1379 n.15. 
90 Jenkins v. Butts Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. CIV 5:15-CV-30 (MTT), 2016 WL 
740461 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2016) (“there is no evidence [the parent] lacked the 
necessary information to determine whether her daughter had been injured by the 
Defendant's actions”). 
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this exception.91 
 
B. Other Asserted Exceptions. 
 
 Parents have attempted to import other exceptions beyond the 
two explicit IDEA SOL exceptions.  However, in light of Congress’s 
choice to limit the express exceptions to this tandem pair,92 the 
legislative history,93 and the administrative agency interpretation,94 
the prevailing judicial view is that the common law doctrines of 
equitable tolling95 and minority tolling96 do not apply.  Similarly, for 
the same reasons,97 the weight of judicial authority thus far has rather 
clearly favored the inapplicability of the continuing violations theory 
                                                            
91 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
92 See, e.g., D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 248 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citing the canon of construction of exclusio unis). 
93 See, e.g., id. (citing S. REP. 108-85, at 40 (2003)). 
94 See, e.g., id. (citing 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,697 (Aug. 14, 2006)). 
95 See, e.g., D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d at 248; Holden v. Miller-
Smith, 28 F. Supp. 3d 729, 735–36 (W.D. Mich. 2014); D.C. v. Klein Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 739, 746–47 (S.D. Tex. 2010); cf. Breanne v. S. York Cnty. 
Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (denying its applicability 
at least “under the circumstances present here”); L.P. v. Longmeadow Pub. Sch., 59 
IDELR ¶ 169, at *11 (D. Mass. 2012) (finding it inapplicable in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances).  The effect of most of these decisions, including 
D.K., was to apply an otherwise unchallenged “look-back” bar of any claims more 
than two-years before the date of filing the complaint. 
96 See, e.g., D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d at 248; Reyes v. Manor 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 33, at *5 (W.D. Tex. 2016); Baker v. S. York Area 
Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 214, at *5 (M.D. Pa. 2009); cf. Breanne v. S. York Cnty. 
Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp. 2d 504, 513 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (denying its applicability at 
least in the factual circumstances of this case); Piazza v. Florida Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d 669, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting this doctrine for pre-
IDEA 2004 claims, while noting split in judicial authority during that silent 
period).  But cf. Michelle K. v. Pentucket Reg’l Sch. Dist., 79 F. Supp. 3d 361, 
372–73 (D. Mass. 2015) (applying to claims filed by now-adult student and 
seemingly tangential to exhaustion ruling).  For a comprehensive analysis of the 
IDEA that supports the non-applicability of minority tolling, see Lynn Daggett, 
LeeAnn Gurysh & Perry A. Zirkel, For Whom the School Bell Tolls But Not the 
Statute of Limitations: Minors and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 
38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717 (2005). 
97 See, e.g., J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 622 F. Supp. 2d 257, 268–69 
(W.D. Pa. 2008). 
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in IDEA SOL cases.98 
 
IV. DURATION AND EFFECT 
 
The duration of the SOL for the impartial hearing under IDEA 
2004 is clearly two years, except for the few states that have adopted 
a different period,99 as the pertinent provision expressly permits.100  
The first problem is that, contrary to typical practice of a look-back 
application from the date of the hearing request,101 the period counts 
forward from the KOSHK date.102  The second problem is the issue 
                                                            
98 See, e.g., D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d at 248; E.F. v. Newport 
Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 265, at *12 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Jefferson 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Lolita S., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1124 (N.D. Ala. 2013), aff’d 
on other grounds, 581 F. App’x 760 (11th Cir. 2014); Bell v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 50 IDELR ¶ 285, at *14–16 (D.N.M. 2010).  But cf. Jana 
K. v. Annville-Cleona Sch. Dist., 39 F. Supp. 3d 584, 598–600 (M.D. Pa. 2014) 
(applying purportedly distinguishable use of continuing violations to fill out the 
2+2 analysis in a child find case); K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295, 
at *17–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying similarly confusing accrual analysis to find 
FAPE claim not time barred for at least 14 years). The effect of most of these 
decisions, including D.K., was to apply an otherwise unchallenged “look-back” bar 
of any claims more than two-years before the date of filing the complaint.  See also 
D.C. v. Mount Olive Twp. Bd. of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 78 (D.N.J. 2014). 
       99 A leading example is the Texas law, which specifies a period of one year 
from the KOSHK date.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. A variation is 
Alaska’s one-year period from “the date that the school district provides the parent 
with written notice of the decision with which the parent disagrees.”  See supra 
note 82.  As an example in the opposite direction, Kentucky provides for a period 
of three years from the KOSHK.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.224(6) (West 2013).  
In contrast, most states that specified a different period have revised their laws to 
conform to the IDEA’s 2004 amendments.  See, e.g., Ms. S. v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 72, 
64 IDELR ¶ 202, at *6-9 (D. Me. 2014) (citing ME. CODE R. 07-071, ch. 101, § 
XVI.13.E–F, which changed the limitations period from four to two years); K.H. v. 
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing N.Y. EDUC. 
LAW § 4401(1)(a) (2013), which changed limitations period from one to two 
years).  As a variation, Hawaii changed from 90 days to the two-year IDEA 
limitations period with an exception: hearing requests for tuition reimbursement 
have a 180-day period.  K.D. ex rel. C.L. v. Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw., 665 
F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011); Teresa L. v. Dep’t of Educ., Haw., 325 F. App’x 
583, 584 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-443(a) (2011)).   
100 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
101 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra text accompanying notes 28–29. 
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of whether the tandem provision in the IDEA103 establishes a two-
year limit in the opposite direction from the KOSHK date or, if not, 
what the limit in the past is for the scope of the hearing?104   
In a recent published decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the so-called “2+2” ruling of the lower court, which, along 
with a few other district courts in Pennsylvania,105 interpreted the 
plain language of the pair of SOL provisions in IDEA 2004 as 
extending not only up to two years forward, but also up to two years 
back, from the KOSHK date.106  Instead, based on the statutory text, 
legislative history, and agency interpretation, the Third Circuit 
concluded that the two provisions refer, although “inartful[ly],”107 to 
the same two-year filing deadline for a due process complaint after 
the KOSHK date.108  Thus, the court resolved the first issue by 
reemphasizing that the two-year filing deadline is forward from the 
KOSHK date, not either forward from the date of injury or a look 
back from the date of filing.109  Moreover, the Third Circuit similarly 
cited D.K. to make clear that “parental vigilance is vital” to this filing 
deadline, suggesting a relatively strict approach to the prescribed 
period and sole exceptions.110 
Even more significantly, contrary to the two-year limitation on 
                                                            
103 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
104 As a way of avoiding both problems, a federal court in Texas effectively 
arrived at the same result as the look-back approach by reasoning that, in the 
absence of applicable exceptions, “any claims for acts and omissions Plaintiff knew 
or should have known about prior to [the date one year before the filing date] are 
time-barred.”  T.C. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. CIV 4:13cv186, 2016 WL 
705930 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2016). 
105 See, e.g., Jana K. ex rel. Tim K. v. Annville-Cleona Sch. Dist., 39 F. Supp. 
3d 584 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Morgan M. v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 64 IDELR ¶ 309 
(E.D. Pa. 2015). 
106 G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 614-15 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
107 Id at 605; see also id. at 625 (“the inconsistent language reflects nothing 
more than a drafting error in [Congress’s] reconciliation process”). 
108 Id. at 616–25. 
109 Id. at 625 (citing D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist. 696 F.3d 233, 248, 254 (3d 
Cir. 2012). 
110 Id.  For example, the court warned that “parents may not, without satisfying 
one of the two statutory exceptions, knowingly sit on their rights or attempt to 
sweep both timely and expired claims into a single ‘continuing violation’ claim 
brought years later.”  Id.   
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the other side of the KOSHK date in the “2+2” approach, the Third 
Circuit adopted a rather open-ended interpretation of the 
retrospective remedial scope of a timely filed complaint.111  In 
contrast to the common although not universal practice of various 
IHOs and courts of applying the filing period on a look-back basis as 
the scope of the claim,112 the Third Circuit ruled—based on its pre-
IDEA 2004 compensatory education standard113 and the IDEA 
2004’s legislative history114— that the limitations period “is not a cap 
                                                            
111 Id. at 625–26.  The G.L court made clear its analysis consisted of two 
successive parts by characterizing the “upshot” of its analysis as “two-fold” and by 
stating its concluding holding in as a tandem, flowchart-like sequence.  Id. at 625.   
112 Illustrations of this application are available in the cases identified supra 
note 27.  Providing further reinforcement of this application are the rather 
consistent line of cases that allocate to the IHO’s discretion the admission of 
evidence for the time before the filing period but only for background, not liability.  
See, e.g., Phyllene W. v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., No. 15-10123, 2015 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 18911 (11th Cir. Oct. 30, 2015); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413 v. H.M.J. 
ex rel. A.J., M.N., No. CIV. 14-2114 JRT/HB, 2015 WL 4744505 (D. Minn. 2015); 
Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw. v. E.B., 45 IDELR ¶ 249, at *5 (D. Haw. 2006).  The 
limited exception for this interpretation is for the calculation of compensatory 
education in jurisdictions that use the qualitative approach and only in cases where 
the amount “reasonably calculated to provide the educational benefits that likely 
would have accrued from special education services the school district should have 
supplied in the first place” exceeds the hour-for-hour duration of the denial of 
FAPE within the applicable period.  Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 
(D.C. Cir. 2005).  For an example of such a situation, see Cent. Sch. Dist. v. K.C., 
61 IDELR ¶ 125, at *11 & n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2013).  
113 G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 618–19 (citing M.C. 
ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396-97 (3d Cir. 1996)).  
However, this standard was based on the district’s, not the parent’s KOSHK date, 
and it introduced the inconsistently interpreted concept of “accrual.”  For tuition 
reimbursement cases, the issue of the scope of liability is often not acute.  
However, it is not entirely free from disputes.  See supra note 31.  Moreover, in 
some tuition reimbursement cases, the parent may be additionally seeking 
compensatory education for the period prior to the unilateral placement. 
114 Id. at 624 (citing 150 Cong. Rec. S11851 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) 
(statement of Sen. Tom Harkin)).  With regard to the legislative history, the court 
also cited Valverde, supra note 12, at 643–46.  Interestingly, although Valverde, 
who is a clinical professor serving primarily low-income clients, advanced this 
view of the legislative history, her ultimate recommendation was for Congress to 
amend the IDEA’s remedial scheme to codify compensatory education on a 
broadened basis to rectify this economic inequity and make this intent clear.  Id. at 
668.  Both the court and Valverde also cited Robert R. v. Marple Newtown School 
District, 44 IDELR ¶ 186 (E.D. Pa. 2005), but this case was based on the pre-IDEA 
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on a child’s remedy for timely-filed claims that happen to date back 
more than two years before the complaint is filed.”115  And, as the 
counter-weight for the strict-on-parent approach for the filing 
period,116 the court extracted from its past decisions a strict-on-
district application for this remedial period.117 
But how far back does this pre-KOSHK date period go?  By 
focusing on the remedy, or “the redress available for timely-filed 
claims,”118 the Third Circuit left the answer open to interpretation.119  
For example, in one part of the opinion the court appeared to extend 
the remedial boundary to “claims not yet reasonably knowable,”120 
yet in another part the court appeared to reaffirm its early and 
repeated standard for compensatory education that the boundary is 
“the point that the school district ‘knows or should know of the injury 
to the child.”121  The rubbery and not clearly defined elasticity of the 
remedial period is further evident in the court’s citation of its prior 
compensatory education rulings,122 including the potential eight-year 
                                                            
SOL and only cited the IDEA 2004 legislative history as indirect support for its 
interpretation of the prior Third Circuit decisions. 
115 G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 616.  In contrast, the 
common practice (supra note 27) provides a clear cut-off that, with the limited 
exception for the qualitative calculation of compensatory education, yields a period 
that may well be longer than the Third Circuit’s answer to the triggering issue of 
G.L., but may well be shorter than the Third Circuit’s answer for G.L.’s remedial 
issue. 
116 See supra text accompanying note 110. 
117 G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 625-26 (citing M.C. v. 
Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
118 Id. at 612. 
119 For an alternate open ended approach, see, e.g., K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding KOSHK triggered claims 
spanning entire 14-year period of eligibility). 
120 Id. at 617.  For further dicta in the opinion that suggested an open-ended 
approach, see id. at 620 (“any claim for [a] violation, however far back it dates.”) 
and id. at 618 (citing a previous Third Circuit case, that “‘nothing in the text or 
history suggest[s] that relief under IDEA is limited in any way . . . .’” Id. (emphasis 
added)). 
       121 Id. at 618 (citing, e.g., D.F. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 694 F.3d at 499; M.C. v. 
Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396–97 (3d Cir. 1996)).  As observed supra 
note 113, this formulation amounts to an earlier, different KOSHK. 
122 Id. at 620.  Moreover, by citing the D.C. Circuit’s decision and standard in 
Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit 
reinforced the present ambiguity as to whether it has replaced the quantitative with 
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period in Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E.123  Moreover, the 
facts in G.L. are not particularly helpful because the KOSHK date 
and timeliness of the filing were effectively beyond dispute124 and the 
student’s enrollment started for a relatively limited period before the 
KOSHK date.125  
For this “elephant” in G.L.’s SOL room,126 the arguably 
appropriate approach is to define the back-side boundary as the 
reasonably determined start of the alleged violation.  More 
specifically, based on the statutory specification of “the alleged 
action that forms the basis of the complaint”127 and the G.L. 
                                                            
the qualitative approach for calculating compensatory education.  For an overview 
of these two approaches, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Two Competing 
Approaches for Calculating Compensatory Education under the IDEA, 257 EDUC. 
L. REP. 550 (2010).  For an earlier Third Circuit example of this ambiguity, see 
Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 2010).  For a 
discussion of the seeming transition, see Jana K. v. Annville-Cleona Sch. Dist., 39 
F. Supp. 3d 584, 606–08 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
123 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999). 
124 G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 606 (3d Cir. 2015). 
125 After spending the previous year in parochial school, the student reenrolled 
in the district in September 2008, and the KOSHK date was March 9, 2010, which 
was when the parents withdrew the student from the district and enrolled him in a 
cyber charter school.  Id. at 605–06.  Soon after September 2008, the student’s 
parent requested an evaluation, which is the earliest point to which they could 
stretch their child find claim, as reflected in their claim for denial of FAPE.  Id. at 
606.  The IHO, following prevailing practice, limited the FAPE and, thus, remedial 
analysis, to the two-year window before the January 9, 2012 filing date, thereby 
excluding the 2008-2009 school year and the first half of the 2009-10 school year.  
Id. at 607.  Although the IHO ruled that the district had not denied FAPE for the 
three months within the window that he was enrolled in the district, the effect of 
G.L. on remand is to open up the window for the requested compensatory 
education to an inexactly defined period that is limited, again by enrollment 
considerations, to an outermost possible boundary of September 2008.  Although 
the applicable window, if the case does not end in settlement, likely extends to this 
September start based on the alleged child find injury and the relatively limited 
period, the precise point that G.L. intends for other cases is a relatively open 
question.  
126 Id. at 617 (reiterating the judicial expression about not hiding “‘elephants in 
mouseholes’”) (citing E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 
1584, 1612 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  In comparison, G.L.’s resolution of the 
first, triggering issue is a relative mousehole. 
127 See supra text accompanying notes 19, 21. 
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opinion’s repeated reference to “the injury,”128 including its 
“practical example” of a three-year child find claim reasonably 
discovered by the parents at the end of the third year,129 IHOs and 
courts need to look first at the language of the complaint130 and 
ultimately decide the alleged action that they knew or should have 
known.  This second determination may be at least as significant as 
determining the KOSHK date.131  This action date serves as the 
boundary for not only the basis of the FAPE-denial remedy132 but 
also, except for discretionary background information,133 the scope of 
admissible evidence. 
A more definitive identification of the outer boundary, or the date 
of KOSHK “action,” awaits further litigation in not only the Third 
Circuit, which has been the locus of most of the case law to date,134 
but also courts in other jurisdictions, which did not automatically or 
universally adopt its corresponding initiative for compensatory 
                                                            
128 E.g., G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d at 604–05, 607, and 
611. 
       129 Id. at 613–14.  Seemingly synonymous, the court also referred to this action 
more than once as the “violation.”  Id. at 614–15 and 621.   
130 The IDEA requires that the complaint state “the nature of the problem of 
the child relating to [the] proposed initiation or change, including facts relating to 
such problem” and, “to the extent known and available to the party at the time,” its 
proposed resolution.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii)(III–(IV)). 
      131 On an overlapping or alternative basis, this determination amounts to a 
revisiting of the more complete analysis of the KOSHK triggering date.  See supra 
text accompanying note 30.  Indeed, it may be seen as integral to the KOSHK date 
resolution, showing the importance of determining the alleged action, because it 
serves as the starting point to determine 1) when the parent knew or should have 
known about it and, thus, whether the filing was timely, and 2) if timely, the period 
for the evidentiary basis for the remedy. 
      132 Moving back from the focus on the action, which in compensatory education 
cases is the denial of FAPE, the aforementioned limited exception of the qualitative 
approach (supra note 112) applies to the remedy, which is the focus in G.L.   
133 Id. 
134 Another reason that IHOs and courts in the Third Circuit are likely to face 
this issue imminently is that two of the three states in the region, Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey rank fifth and sixth in IHO decisions and second and sixth in court 
decisions under the IDEA.  Zirkel, supra note 4, at 10; Bailey & Zirkel, supra note 
4, at 7. 
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education.135  Moreover, the IDEA’s administering agency, the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Office of Special Education Programs 
(OSEP) may provide guidance.136   
Meanwhile, in the Third Circuit and in those jurisdictions that 
follow its lead, the filing party will be very careful in its drafting of 
the complaint to define not only the alleged KOSHK date but also the 
scope of the underlying action’s scope so as to maximize the odds in 
favor of both the timeliness of the request and the extent of the 
remedy.  The resolution of these issues is high stakes for the parties 
in terms of liability and for IHOs in terms of the chronological scope 
of the evidence within the already taxed forty-five day limit for the 
decision.137  It is also predicable that these twin SOL issues will be 
particularly problematic in cases that include child find claims for 
compensatory education relief.138  Finally, for the second of these 
                                                            
135 The Second Circuit does not share the Third Circuit’s position on the 
requisite denial of FAPE, at least for plaintiff-students beyond age twenty-one.  
See, e.g., P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 512 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d 
on other grounds, 546 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Garro v. Dep’t of Educ., 23 
F.3d 734 (2d Cir. 1994)); cf. V.M. v. N. Colonie Sch. Dist., 954 F. Supp. 2d 102 
(N.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1990)); J.A. v. 
E. Ramapo Sch. Dist., 603 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (also citing Mrs. C. v. 
Wheaton).   Moreover, the Third Circuit’s original approach to the calculation of 
compensatory education is now the minority view.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of 
Fayette Cnty. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 2007); Reid v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 401 F.2d 516, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Perry A. Zirkel, 
Compensatory Education: An Annotated Update of the Law, 291 EDUC. L.  REP. 1, 
6 n.49 (2013) (citing more recent cases). 
136 Letter to Zirkel, 66 IDELR ¶ 288 (OSEP 2015):  
The [G.L.] Court also held that neither provision limits remedies to injuries 
that occurred within two years before the KOSHK date, and that, if parents 
timely file a complaint and liability is proven, the entire period of the 
violation should be remedied.  In light of the Court's decision, the 
Department is continuing to deliberate to determine whether further 
guidance is necessary. 
137 300 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (2013).  Approximately half of all adjudicated 
hearings do not meet the forty-five day deadline without extensions, with 
particularly high proportions in the active states of California (93%), Pennsylvania 
(81%), and New York (77%).  U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
SPECIAL EDUCATION: IMPROVED PERFORMANCE MEASURES COULD ENHANCE 
OVERSIGHT OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 24–25 (Aug. 2014), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665434.pdf 
138 It is not happenstance that G.L., the practical example it offered, and the 
several of the decisions that it cited, including Forest Grove v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 
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two issues, one cannot help but wonder how the Third Circuit’s 
ruling squares with the primary purposes of a SOL.139 
 
V. PRACTICE POINTERS FOR IHOS 
 
Given the diversity of IHO systems140 under the IDEA structure 
of “cooperative federalism,”141 the following set of practice 
recommendations warrants careful customization depending on the 
jurisdiction and discretion of the IHO. 
First, using the previous parts of this article as a starting point, 
become familiar with the variation, if any, of the two-year period in 
state law and in the case law interpretations of the relevant 
determinations, such as the possibly applicable exceptions to the 
prescribed period.   
Second, if the SOL is at issue,142 presumably via the defending 
party’s answer to the initiating complaint143 but in any event before 
the hearing starts,144 be prepared to follow up quickly to instruct the 
parties as to your expectations for timely arguments, evidence, and 
authority specific to the KOSHK date, the underlying action, and any 
other SOL factors that may be at issue.  In such cases, encourage 
stipulations to limit the areas of dispute, and consider whether 
bifurcation with a timely interim order would be appropriate instead 
                                                            
(2009), contained a child find claim and that most, unlike Forest Grove, were 
premised on compensatory education, not tuition reimbursement.   Representing 
another ad hoc determination, child find amounts to ascertaining whether the 
district had reasonable suspicion of eligibility and, if so, when it was and whether 
the district conducted the evaluation within a reasonable period.  See, e.g., Perry A. 
Zirkel, “Child Find”: The Lore v. the Law, 307 EDUC. L. REP. 574 (2014). 
139 See supra text accompanying note 16. 
140 See Zirkel & Scala, supra note 3. 
141 E.g., Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005). 
142 Raising the issue sua sponte may or may not be problematic.  See, e.g., 
Perry A. Zirkel, Impartial Hearings under the IDEA: Legal Issues and Answers 16 
(Jan. 2016), http://www.nasdse.org/Publications/tabid/577/Default.aspx.  Similarly, 
consider whether having the parties stipulate as to a two-year “look back” period is 
advisable. 
143 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.   
144 In jurisdictions that mandate or permit it, a prehearing conference, whether 
live or via technology, is best practice for identifying and managing such issues. 
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of integrating this issue with the rest of the case.145  If the triggering 
date is at issue, make sure the evidence as to the KOSHK date is 
sufficiently specific as to when the parents had the necessary facts as 
to the particular claim(s).146  If exceptions are at issue, recognize, as a 
rebuttable presumption, their judicially construed narrowness.147 
Third, if you determine that the parents timely filed one or more 
claims, recognize that the period for the denial of FAPE and its 
remedy may (or may not) be longer than the period between the 
KOSHK date and the filing date, depending on (1) the applicable 
interpretation of the alleged action148 and (2) the IHO’s equitable 
remedial authority.149 
Finally, within the established policy grounds for timeliness 
under the SOL generally150 and for IDEA decision-making 
specifically,151 make extra but efficient efforts for thorough fact 
finding and legal conclusions for SOL determinations, because 
appeals are likely until the courts in your jurisdiction arrive at more a 
more clearly settled state of the law for these significant and nuanced 
issues.152  This issue is an opportunity for IHOs to exert their 
expertise and efficiency for the sake of sensible and effective case 
law under the IDEA.  
 
 
                                                            
145 For the hearing officer’s discretionary authority to provide the parties with a 
fair but efficient opportunity for arguments and evidence as to the applicable SOL, 
see T.C. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. CIV 4:13cv186, 2016 WL 705930 
(E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2016). 
146 For the possibility of differentiated determinations for multiple claims, see, 
e.g., K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 295, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). 
147 See supra notes 57–98 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 103–36 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra note 26. 
150 See supra text accompanying note 16. 
151 See supra note 18; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (2014) (short timeline 
for completing the IHO decision). 
152 For the judicial deference accorded to through IHO decisions, see, e.g., 
Pointe Educ. Serv. v. A.T., 610 F. App’x 702 (9th Cir. 2015); Cerra v. Pawling 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2005); Doyle v. Arlington Sch. Dist., 953 
F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1991); Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Sch., 931 F.2d 84 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991). 
